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The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Tom Stern, comprises 16 chapters (and an 
Introduction) covering a range of topics in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Given that it is billed as a 
companion, one would expect a balanced approach to debates in Nietzsche studies, alongside 
informative overviews. Unfortunately, the volume suffers from two central faults which undercut 
its ability to achieve this. On the one hand, a number of the chapters lack philosophical substance, 
reading more like discursive intellectual histories. On the other hand, the more philosophically 
inclined essays include misrepresentative snipes at ‘analytic interpreters’ of Nietzsche (mostly those 
notably absent from the volume). Nonetheless, there are worthwhile contributions; in what 
follows, I highlight these and draw attention to examples of where the volume was not up to 
standard.  
Stern’s introductory overview of Nietzsche’s life and works will be helpful for those coming 
to Nietzsche for the first time. A few remarks are, however, worth making concerning Stern’s 
presentation of the so-called ‘mask’ interpretation according to which ‘Nietzsche [is] not committed 
to any particular claims he makes, and perhaps…finds philosophical significance in trying out 
different, even conflicting stances’ (p. 18). Much obviously turns here on what is meant by ‘trying 
out different, even conflicting stances’. If this merely means that we find passages where a view 
and its consequences are articulated, without it being Nietzsche's “official view” then that is hardly 
surprising. Stern’s makes, however, much stronger claims. He suggests two ideas are in play. The 
first is ‘Nietzsche’s [purported] idea that our subjective, cognitive faculties, varying from person 
to person, constitute fundamental properties of (apparent objective) reality’ (p. 18). This 
formulation is difficult to parse in a way which doesn’t sound like a form of idealism. Cognitive 
faculties, say features of the human visual system, may certainly influence how that (apparent) 
objective reality seems to a perceiver (and in ways which may be distorting), but such features 
don’t obviously constitute reality. Stern further frames this view as claiming that ‘consequently my 
reality and your reality differ: there is no neutral or independent perspective, but trying out 
different perspectives might be valuable’ (p. 18). However, the fact that subjects may bring to bear 
idiosyncratic cognitive faculties on their representations on reality doesn’t imply that there isn’t a 
fact of the matter about the nature of what’s represented. Additionally, the idea that different 
human subjects – ‘me’ and ‘you’ – might have such radically different cognitive faculties that we 
literally ‘constitute different realities’ strains credibility.  
Concerning Nietzsche, the central passage about such ‘different perspectives’ concerns affects, 
values, and knowledge (GM III 12). However, there Nietzsche says ‘we can use the difference in 
perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge... [such that] the more eyes, various eyes 
we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our 
‘objectivity’’. That would be an odd thing to say if he merely thought that ‘trying out different 
perspective might be valuable’ (p. 18), and not instead, as he indicates, valuable for knowledge. 
Irrespective of these issues though, even if there were justification for attributing an idealist-
perspectivism to Nietzsche, this would be a claim to which he is committed, rather than something 
supporting the ‘mask’ interpretation. 
Second, Stern suggests the additional plank to the mask-interpretation is ‘the idea that 
philosophy is (for Nietzsche) a form of self-expression and self-creation, with no one ‘philosophy’ 
being appropriate for all. The correct question, when confronting a philosophy, is not, therefore, 
‘is this true’ but rather ‘does this work (for me, for her)’’ (p.18). Stern arguably confuses a point 
Nietzsche repeatedly makes about morality with a claim about philosophy. Nietzsche thought that 
no one morality was appropriate for all. Indeed, this anti-universalism serves as one plank of his 
critique of morality (in the pejorative sense). Moreover, Nietzsche is perspicuous in recognising 
that many self-proclaimed moralists espouse evaluative outlooks which while claiming to be ‘what 
is objectively right or good’ in fact merely serve their best interests. However, this is surely a 
descriptive rather than normative hypothesis; the idea is presumably, this is what people do, rather than 
this is how people should behave. 
Concerning philosophy, Nietzsche doesn’t recommend a self-conscious ‘pick whatever 
philosophy works for you’ attitude, which would be self-undermining. If I renounce the idea that 
the ‘philosophy’ I subscribe to is true (or truth-aiming) how could it have the salutary quasi-ethical 
effects of ‘working for me’? Think of the Christian whose belief in an after-life, and other theistic 
propositions, have salutary effects. If they think their belief is merely a reflection of some 
emotional need they have, or that they have merely ‘picked’ the belief for its purported beneficial 
effects, then that would undermine that belief satisfying their emotional quasi-practical needs.  
When providing his brief overview of possible interpretations of Nietzsche, one might have 
hoped that Stern would have been more critical of this ‘mask’ reading, or signalled significant 
problems with it. The contrast he draws with so-called ‘Doctrinal’ interpreters – roughly those 
‘analytic’ scholars who take Nietzsche to be staking out philosophical positions on issues of central 
importance to him (i.e., psychology, drives, values, affects) and who are a recurrent bogeyman in 
the volume – is not entirely helpful either.  
The ‘Influencers and Interlocutors’ (Part I) provides background for those coming to 
Nietzsche for the first time. Unfortunately, that background is not as philosophically rigorous as 
one would like. For example, consider Andreas Urs Sommer’s chapter documenting, as its title 
suggest, ‘What Nietzsche Did and Did not read’. While there is interesting material here for the 
specialist, this chapter will be of little use to students or more philosophically minded readers. 
There is a significant difference between using what Nietzsche read (or did not) to situate him in 
a historical context which makes sense of his substantive philosophical claims (see, e.g. Leiter 2015; 
ch.2 ‘Intellectual History and Background’), and mere documenting of the former – Sommer’s piece 
rarely goes beyond documenting. Robert Wicks chapter on Schopenhauer is better in this regard 
and will be helpful for those looking to draw connections between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.  
The most contentious contribution of the volume is Stephen Mulhall’s ‘On Nietzsche’s 
Legacy’. It is pegged as a meta-commentary on the last 30 years of Anglophone Nietzsche 
scholarship, mostly focused on so-called ‘analytic’ interpretations – the spoiler is that Mulhall (like 
Stern) isn’t a fan. Mulhall even goes as far to suggest that such interpreters suffer from reflexive 
myopia: ‘to the extent that the new analytic reception of Nietzsche generally tends to treat his 
contribution to philosophy as reducible without significant remainder to a series of distinct 
contributions to specific sub-branches of the disciple (e.g., ethics, mind, epistemology) then…their 
reception of Nietzsche is marked by the very ascetic ideal he criticises’ (p. 140). This is surprising 
since two ‘exemplars’ of the approach which is presumably Mulhall’s target – Leiter and Katsafanas 
– see these ‘sub-disciplines’ as inextricably tied together in Nietzsche works. Leiter’s (2019) 
‘Naturalistic’ (or ‘Humean’) Nietzsche, whose philosophical psychology is based in unconscious 
drives and type-facts, connects with the ‘Therapeutic’ Nietzsche’s cultural project of ridding 
nascent higher-types of their false consciousness by affecting them at a drive-level beneath rational 
persuasion (Leiter also emphasises quasi-ethical themes of Amor Fati throughout his work). 
Katsafanas (2016), on the other hand, offers an understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
psychology which holds open space for forms of reflective choice and efficacious willing which 
allows him to provide a positive gloss on specific Nietzschean ethical themes like self-creation and 
freedom, so tying ethics and mind together in a distinctive way. Katsafanas also consistently 
emphasises the role of culture and history for Nietzsche in shaping our drives and affects.  
It would be helpful, and useful to students, to have a more impartial commentary on the 
reception of Nietzsche in the Anglophone world, and one which did not engage in straw-manning. 
Nonetheless, contained within the chapter are substantive critical remarks on Leiter’s Naturalistic 
reading which warrant further comment.  According to Leiter (2015, 2019), Nietzsche’s naturalism 
is methodological in the sense that the philosophical explanations he offers aim (broadly) at continuity 
with the methods, or more aptly methods of explanation, of the successful empirical sciences of the 
day, which for Nietzsche were the burgeoning 19th-century life-sciences of physiology and biology. 
As Leiter puts it: ‘Human beings are fundamentally bodily organisms, creatures whose physiology 
explains most or all of their conscious life and behaviour. Nietzsche adds to this Materialist 
doctrine the proto-Freudian idea that the unconscious psychic life of the person [e.g., the drives] 
is also of paramount importance in the causal determination of conscious life and behaviour’ 
(Leiter 2019: 3). The result is the Nietzschean Doctrine of Types: Each person has a more or less fixed 
psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person. The resulting philosophical 
psychology is nonetheless speculative – in much the way that Hume’s moral psychology was a 
speculative account of human nature which was methodologically continuous with certain 
deterministic Newtonian patterns of explanations in physics. Furthermore, the proffered claims 
are not to be confirmed in the way that, for example, a physiological claim of Nietzsche’s day 
would have been. Instead, what Nietzsche offers is a speculative human psychology which seeks 
the general causal determinants of the broadest range of human behaviour (acting, thinking, 
perceiving, feeling), in such a way that those explanations are of-a-piece with kinds of explanations 
offered in the burgeoning life-sciences of his day.  
Mulhall criticises Leiter’s reading on numerous scores, but let me focus on one. He claims that 
the notion of ‘empirical sciences’ is ill-defined, such that the characterisation of naturalism 
becomes insubstantial – it is unclear whether it extends beyond the natural sciences to the social 
sciences which concern empirical inquiry into ‘cultural explanations’ of human behaviour. If it 
does extend so widely then it becomes ‘hard to see what modes of inquiry fall outside this category 
– except of course, those invoking supernatural or transcendental factors. But that negative 
specification of naturalism is precisely what dissatisfied Leiter at the outset, and which he is 
supposed to be providing a positive alternative’ (p. 128). In response, note that Leiter is explicit in 
emphasising that the empirical sciences that so-impressed Nietzsche were the burgeoning life-
sciences of biology and physiology, and that this clearly has a substantial effect on how Nietzsche’s 
naturalism is understood (say contrastingly with how Hume’s naturalism was informed by the 
Newtonian paradigm in physics). So, the criticism is misplaced. At least part of the substance to 
Leiter’s characterisation of Nietzsche’s naturalism comes not from delimiting what is and what is 
not to count as a successful empirical science – we, broad brush, already know that (psychology is 
one, astrology isn’t) – but rather in specifying more narrowly the specific empirical sciences with which 
Nietzsche sought a kind of methodological (and at least on certain specific points substantive) 
continuity with, and which informed the kinds of explanations, he was seeking to provide. 
Mulhall’s preference for Bernard Williams’ characterisation of these matters – the so-called 
‘minimalist’ moral psychology – hardly fares any better qua being substantial. Mulhall glosses this 
attitude ‘realistic’ rather than’ naturalistic’: ‘what is at issue is not the application of an already 
defined scientific programme but rather an informed interpretation of some human experiences 
and activities in relation to others’ (p. 130). But the former is a caricature of Nietzsche’s naturalism 
on Leiter’s reading: in explaining human behaviour by reference to unconscious type-facts 
specified in terms of drives and affects (whose basis is physiological) Nietzsche would not be 
applying some ‘already defined scientific programme’ – there simply wasn’t scientific physio-
psychology of this kind in Nietzsche’s day. Rather he would be engaged in a speculative philosophical 
psychology which evinces a methodological continuity with the successful sciences of his day.  
The ‘Selected Texts’ portion of the volume (Part II) covers The Birth of Tragedy (Paul Daniels), 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Dirk Johnson), Beyond Good and Evil (Robert Pippin) and On the Genealogy of 
Morality (Christa Acampora). These provide, to varying degrees, helpful commentaries on those 
texts. Acampora’s is the best of these, displaying sensitivity to the text, and introducing themes in 
an informative way.  
Pippin’s contribution is idiosyncratic by comparison. He makes much of Nietzsche’s use of 
stylistic devices in Beyond Good and Evil to push the idea that Nietzsche's philosophy isn’t (at least 
primarily) a matter of certain ‘fixed’ doctrines whose truth-value we should be interested in (a 
recurrent theme in Stern and Mulhall also). As Pippin puts it in his conclusion: ‘the approach taken 
here would mean that the basic question for any reader is not primarily: is what Nietzsche is saying 
about the ‘will to power’ true? The prior questions, ones we may never get fully beyond, are on 
the order of: What is actually being said, and especially, what is the point of saying it? What is he 
trying to do by saying it’? (p. 214). There is a modicum of sense here: given certain aspects of 
Nietzsche’s style, we may never be certain that we have ascertained the correct view on what he is 
saying on any given matter. However, Pippin’s point is exaggerated. A legitimate and fairly basic 
question would be given a reasonable reconstruction of Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, which 
is grounded in the texts and aims to be faithful to them, is that hypothesis true. Notably, there is 
also a price that comes with seeing Nietzsche as always, rather than just sometimes, engaged in an 
esoteric meta-project of not just stating (albeit in suggestive and non-committal ways) his 
philosophical views, but always saying things for some never explicitly stated ‘effects’ (‘what he is 
trying to do by saying it’). It makes the interpretive project closer to that of trying to uncover 
Nietzsche’s ‘hidden intentions’, something which lends itself to a form of speculation 
unconstrained by textual evidence.  
Part III concerns ‘Truth History and Science’, the highlight of which is Sebastian Gardner’s 
‘Nietzsche on the Arts and the Sciences’. Gardner provides a suggestive commentary on the issue 
of what Nietzsche wants from art and science, and how the resulting picture may be consistent. 
Gardner sums up the tension nicely: ‘the difficulties we face in interpretation Nietzsche’s view of 
art and science begin with the fact that…in many places Nietzsche appears to accept as given the 
authority of the natural sciences…while elsewhere he seems to regard aesthetic experience as a 
source, paradigm, and guarantor of normativity…’ (p. 311). Simply put: can Nietzsche sustain both 
a commitment to the epistemic value of natural science and the normative value of art and aesthetic 
experience? Gardner provides reasons for resisting readings that would involve subordinating art 
to science, stressing the aesthetic and evaluative perspectives that figure centrally in parts of 
Nietzsche’s texts. However, it is unclear who would subscribe to the subordination in the first 
instance. In a now recurring oddity of the volume, Gardner points to the so-called ‘analytic readers 
of Nietzsche…[who] make natural science sovereign’ (p. 311). This characterisation of ‘analytic 
readers’ is an unhelpful caricature, even if one were to consider just naturalistic interpretations. 
And some ‘analytic’ readers (e.g., Poellner and Ridley) write extensively about aesthetic experience 
in Nietzsche, but do not ‘make natural science sovereign’.  
Gardner sums Nietzsche’s outlook as follows: ‘[It] combines an affirmation that natural 
science is what fixes the truth of our beliefs with a denial that the scientific image of the world 
determines its own reception. Nietzsche’s reasons for crediting science with truth, to the extent 
that he sees need to articulate them, are most often simply rehearsals of Enlightenment anti-
supernaturalism and empiricist conventional wisdom. His basis for denying that science fills out 
the space of reason, by contrast, is profoundly original’ (p. 314). The latter, Gardner claims, turns 
on how the sceptical impetus of science is turned on science itself, which reveals that ‘modern science 
cannot…pretend to take the place of value as we understand it, it must necessarily appear to us as 
a circumscribed limited enterprise’ (p. 315). Given this, art can play a unique function: ‘what art 
provides is a surrogate Archimedean point, a place within the manifest image through which the 
scientific image can be mediated, and values revalued, without capitulation to the moral 
interpretation of existence’ (p. 317). 
While Gardner does not spell this out in detail, the idea that (i) there is a thread running 
through Nietzsche’s work which aims to cultivate a de-moralised quasi-aesthetic experience which 
is connected to value (a state Gardner claims ‘tends towards plenitude’), and (ii) this experience is 
intended to ease the fall of the devaluing of the standpoint of science, seems a fruitful interpretative 
line. One idea worth exploring in this area, but which Gardner does not touch upon, is the role of 
affective-evaluative experience in this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, specifically a de-moralised 
receptivity to phenomenal values as instantiated in the mental life of other subjects. Think for example 
of the nadir of phenomenal disvalue Nietzsche sees represented by the mental life of ‘men of 
ressentiment’, and the apex of value he locates in a certain kind of outlook-looking receptivity to 
‘higher values’ exemplified by the mentality of the ‘noble spirit’. 
In Part IV, ‘Will, Value and Culture’, Lawrence Hatab discusses Nietzsche’s concept of the 
will to power, most interestingly, its relation to the idea of resistance. Hatab glosses this issue as 
follows: ‘Since power can only involve resistance, then one’s power to overcome is essentially tied 
to a counter-power; if resistance were eliminated, if one’s counter-power were destroyed or even 
neutralised by sheer domination, one’s power would evaporate, it would no longer be power’ (p. 
336). This makes for difficult reading, especially when coupled with Hatab’s talk of the will to 
power naming a ‘tensional force-field’, a notion which isn’t sufficiently clarified. Hatab further says 
that ‘Power…is, not something that one has, full stop; it is more originally something towards which 
one strives. Will ‘towards’ power as a drive is not actually goal-directed but activity directed; its 
‘aim’ is the perpetuation of overcoming, not a completed state’ (p. 337). However, as many 
commentators have pointed out, the will to power cannot be simply a will to resistance per se, nor 
can it be willing a state of perpetual frustration. The resistances to be overcome have to be 
embedded in a context which renders them meaningful for the subject, as resistances worth 
overcoming. Furthermore, I have to aim at successfully overcoming them. These are complex issues, 
which – as those versed in current Nietzsche scholarship will be aware – are more neatly framed 
in terms of an interpretation of the will to power as providing an account of the psychological 
structure of desire.  
For Reginster, for example, it provides an account of human desire in which the ends of our 
first-order desires are sought in conjunction with a second-order desire for the feeling of power; a 
hedonic experience occasioned by overcoming resistances (Reginster 2006: 118-147). This second-
order desire – the will to power as the will to overcoming resistance – is dependent on those first-
order desires, insofar as it can only get determinate content and occasion for expression through 
them. This means we cannot informatively characterise the resistances – which in willing power we 
seek to overcome – independently of those determinate first-order desires. This picture generates 
what Reginster highlights as a ‘paradox’ of the will to power since what it takes to satisfy the will to 
power is (1) some first-order desire for a determinate end; (2) resistance to the realisation of this 
determinate end (3); and actual success in overcoming this resistance. Given this set, the conditions 
of the satisfaction of the will to power imply its dissatisfaction: ‘The overcoming of resistance 
eliminates it, but the presence of such resistance is a necessary condition of satisfaction of the will 
to power. Hence, the satisfaction of the will to power implies its own dissatisfaction, in the sense, 
that it necessarily brings it about’ (Reginster 2007: 40). As Nietzsche brilliantly puts it, ‘Indeed, 
who was not defeated in his victory?’ (Z, III 12[30]). This reading captures why Nietzsche describes 
the will to power as insatiable, as always in ‘search’ for new resistances to be overcome. Pursuing 
power in this sense necessarily takes the form of an indefinite, recurrent and renewed striving, in a 
context of determinate valued other ends.  
There are further questions about will to power as a psychological thesis, but couching it at this 
level makes sense of the majority of what is sensible that Nietzsche has to say on the matter, and 
explains his personal-level talk of feelings of power, dissatisfaction, displeasure. Hatab claims, at the start 
of the chapter, that he favours an interpretation of the notion as a ‘counter-metaphysical 
multiplicity of force relations’ and ‘function of valuation and life-affirmation’. The latter aspect 
only gets a passing treatment at the end of the chapter. The former aspect remains somewhat 
mysterious if not cashed out in psychological terms. Given how perplexing the notion of the will 
to power is one might have hoped for a more sober approach in an introductory companion, 
setting out the available interpretative options and criticisms of them in detail. 
 In the best contribution of the volume, Michael Forster provides an overview of the debate 
concerning Nietzsche on free will, providing historical context by way of references to Socrates, 
Plato and the Stoics. This piece is recommended for those coming to this debate for the first time 
looking to get a sense of the different directions of travel viz. Leiter’s deflationary approach (and 
deflationary reading of the much-debated GM II: 2 sovereign individual passage) vs the 
Gemes/Janaway putatively ‘positive’ approach. Forster is also perspicuous in noting that the kind 
of positive conception of freedom that Nietzsche may endorse doesn’t push him back to endorsing 
moral responsibility, guilt or punishment – notions which Forster highlights (as Leiter and others 
have), are bound up with the contra-causal free will Nietzsche rejects. Forster also resists Leiter’s 
‘persuasive definition’ reading of passages on freedom, the idea that Nietzsche radically revises the 
content of the concept of freedom, while exploiting the positive valence the concept has for 
readers, so as to reach them on an ‘affective’ level by associating his ideals with values in which his 
readers are emotionally invested. Forster alternatively and intriguingly suggests that Nietzsche 
positive conception ‘is actually a variant of the very oldest conception of free well; namely that of 
the Stoics, who regarded free will as ‘deterministic, vanishingly rare and more or less identical with 
human excellence (not a precondition of human excellence or vice)’ (p. 390)  
Overall this volume is idiosyncratic and mixed. Instead of a state-of-the-art snapshot of 
Nietzsche-studies married with perspicuous introductions and overviews of central texts, many of 
the contributions lacked philosophical depth. Those that were of a more philosophical bent flirted 
with obscurity and verbosity, not infrequently straw-manning the so-called analytic interpretations. 
That being said, Gardner’s and Foster’s contributions are worth reading, the latter being a fine 
example of the required form and standard of content for a contribution to a companion. It was 
a shame that many of the other contributions fell short of this standard.  
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